India is proud of its lawyers those who brought independence to this country fighting against colonial forces ,may it be through non-violence or bit violence .Fact remains,lawyers the leader over ages,not the judges.
The last two decades have marked the extraordinary rise of India. This has however been tinged with cynicism about our major democratic institutions and a pessimism about their future. The judiciary, which till now has been looked upon as the strongest pillar of Indian democracy, has been beset with unprecedented problems. In recent times, the working of the judges of superior courts (High Courts and the Supreme Court) has come in for intense scrutiny and grave doubts have been cast against the conduct of some judges. The pressing call for greater institutional accountability in the Indian judiciary is now stronger than ever. It is in this light that Parliament’s proposed Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 must be seen.
This Bill appears to be a hurried and knee-jerk reaction to recent events, and has the potential to seriously undermine judicial independence. It seeks to devise a new “complaint procedure” under which any person may be able to file a complaint in writing against any judge of a superior court. Upon such a complaint being filed and examined, the Judicial Oversight Committee (proposed to be constituted under the statute), may either dismiss the complaint or make a reference to Parliament for the removal of the judge, issue advisories, warnings, withdraw judicial work or make a request for voluntary retirement.
The issue of Judicial Standards must be seen in the context of Art 124(4) of the Constitution which provides for the process of impeachment of a judge on the grounds of “proved misbehavior or incapacity.” Art 124(5) empowers Parliament only to make laws to regulate the procedure for presentation of address of impeachment, and for the investigation and proof for the misbehavior or incapacity of a judge.
Cleverly disguised Bill
The present Bill, cleverly disguised as being permissible under Art 124(5), is an example of the most blatant violation of constitutional safeguards and is a cure that is surely worse than the disease. Article 124(5) does not empower Parliament to create any other forum for recommending impeachment proceedings, or allow complaints to be made by any person, or to make a judge liable for minor penalties. What can be done only by a hundred or more members of the Lok Sabha or fifty or more members of the Rajya Sabha (i.e. initiation of impeachment proceedings) can now theoretically be done by only one person.
It is true that judicial commissions exist in other countries like the U.S. and Canada, but their reach does not extend to the apex court. Also, adopting such structures from other countries without having regard to the unique conditions existing in ours, is untenable and fraught with the danger of destabilising our delicate constitutional balance.
Outlined below are some of the other major defects in the Bill:
Definition of misbehavior: The Bill seeks to provide a straight jacketed definition of misbehavior in Clause 2(j), but by laying down a strict definition, the concept loses its elasticity and becomes both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. Over-inclusive, that absent a de minimis exception, even a minor breach of judicial standards, say late filing of assets declaration, could constitute misconduct; and under-inclusive that to the extent that the definition is exhaustive (since it uses the word “means”), it is incapable of catching within its fold any “misbehavior” that might not be covered by this provision. The Constitution framers had been careful not to define the term misbehavior, let alone define it exhaustively. Implicit in this understanding was the belief that if the power of removal was vested in high constitutional authorities, they would be in the best position to judge when misbehavior (or incapacity) had been occasioned.
Statutory provision for judicial standards: The Bill also provides a list of standards of judicial conduct to which all judges are expected to adhere. Sixteen of the 18 enumerated standards are derived from the “Restatement of the Values of Judicial Life” adopted at a Full Court Meeting of the Supreme Court on May 7, 1997. However, the very idea of statutorily providing for judicial standards, irrespective of their content, is violative of judicial independence.
A significant portion of litigation before higher courts today is public in nature and involves the State as one of the parties. Laws are also routinely impugned for their unconstitutionality. Given this, investing the legislature with the power to lay down and amend the standards which all sitting judges must adhere to (or risk the proposed penalties), has the potential to severely threaten impartial and effective adjudication.
Scheme of filing complaints: Under the Bill, “any” person may file a complaint in a prescribed format. Further, the proposed Judicial Oversight Committee will just act as a post-office and refer each complaint to a Scrutiny Panel. This is likely to lead to a multiplicity of complaints and even though the Bill proscribes false and vexatious complaints under Clause 53, this is unlikely to prove much of a deterrent, and since each of them will have to be checked by the Scrutiny Panel, it is also likely to result in a colossal waste of time.
Clause 18 provides that the Oversight Committee shall consist of five persons with two serving and one retired judge, an appointed eminent person and the Attorney-General of India. The presence of the Attorney-General on the Oversight Committee is highly suspect. The Attorney-General has the responsibility of regularly appearing on behalf of the government before the court. On occasions, the possibility of his appearing before a judge against whom a complaint has been filed cannot be ruled out. In such a circumstance, there is clearly a conflict of interest since the Attorney-General will be a member of the Oversight Committee to look into the complaints made against the former.
The Scrutiny Panel is to consist of three members, two of whom will be judges sitting in the same court as the judge against whom the complaint is made. Since these judges would be colleagues sitting in the same court, it is likely that this will, either way, influence their conduct. It would be difficult for judges to dispassionately decide a case against one of their own and sitting with them day in and day out.
Furthermore, the composition and tenure of the Investigation Committee which is to be constituted for the purpose of inquiry into misbehavior by a judge is undefined. Theoretically, therefore, it is possible for a lay person without any knowledge, experience or standing to be a part of an inquiry panel against a sitting judge of a superior Court.
Minor punishments: The idea of “minor” punishments is unworkable and has the potential to seriously undermine judicial status. If sitting judges are issued advisories and warnings and thereby publicly censured, but still continue on the bench and decide cases, this damages the credibility of the entire system.
Atmosphere of secrecy: Through Clause 43, the Bill completely excludes the operation of the RTI. This establishes an atmosphere of total secrecy more regressive than the present system, and for which, there does not appear to be any rational reason to make a change.
It is totally impermissible for the legislature to strike upon the independence and fearlessness of the judiciary. A judge of a superior court cannot be treated as an employee of the government. The present Bill is incapable of salvage and must be rejected in totality. In a system where half the litigants must necessarily lose their cases, and where most of the complaints against judges are frivolous and made by disgruntled litigants, this bill, if implemented, would mark the beginning of the end of the judiciary.
Demands for change to existing systems in the judiciary must be met rationally, bearing in mind the objectives sought to be achieved. The first site of change must be in the process of judicial appointments. The present system where judges of the superior courts are chosen based on undisclosed criterion in largely unknown circumstances reflects an increasing democratic deficit. The legitimacy of the judiciary ultimately flows from public support, which cannot be maintained without a transparent and open selection process.
The guiding principle should always be this: accountability there is and must be, but let it always be commensurate with judicial independence and impartiality. Ultimately, the appropriate balance between competing principles must be found in something that is best suited to our constitutional setup and is, in that sense, uniquely Indian. The citizens of India deserve no less.
(Justice Ajit Prakash Shah is former Chief Justice of the Madras and Delhi High Courts.)